The Italian foreign minister Luigi Di Maio and undersecretary Manlio Di Stefano travelled to Libya on Tuesday to consolidate the ceasefire and seize the opportunity to stabilise the country by revamping a string of economic deals.
The pair will meet with members of the Un-backed government in Tripoli (Gna), including its head Fayez al Serraj and foreign minister Mohamed Siala, and the speaker of the House of Representatives Aguila Saleh. Members of the House (which is also recognised by the Un) were forced to move to Tobruk following the siege of Tripoli in 2019; the city in Cyrenaica will be the second leg of the Italian diplomats’ tour.
The Italian efforts in Libya are signified by the fact that, to this day, Rome is the only Western power to have an open embassy in Tripoli. Ambassador Giuseppe Buccino has been working to foster an intra-Libyan dialogue, deemed by Italy and other Western nations as the preferred way forward to ensure lasting peace. Mr Di Maio is set to reinforce the same effort.
Firstly, Rome is willing to aid the stabilisation of the Gna, shook by Mr al Serraj’s suspension of the interior minister, Fathi Bashaga, over his perceived inadequacy to manage (and alleged role in enhancing) the recent anti-government popular protests.
Zooming out of Tripoli, the most pressing matter at hand is maintaining and reinforcing the dialogue between Mr al Serraj and Mr Saleh. The recent power deal between the two leaders is essential for the ceasefire, which is conditional to Russian and Turkish support and furthers the marginalisation of general Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Eastern rebels.
The latter has apparently lost the support of Mr Saleh, as well as that of France and Egypt, after failing to win back Tripoli and falling back in the East with his forces. As of today, he is only backed by the United Arab Emirates in his pursue of power.
As argued by Daniele Ruvinetti, Libya expert and strategic advisor, the Uae is effectively deadlocking the Libyan situation by refusing to let go of Mr Haftar, having betted considerable resources in his attempts to win back Tripoli and reopen the oil fields.
Only the Us have the negotiation power to convince the UAE to walk back from Mr Haftar, but this doesn’t seem to be within this administration’s interests, given the solidity of their relation (exemplified by the historical normalisation deal between Israel and the UAE, strongly backed by president Donald Trump). This could change however, if Joe Biden wins the White House in November, noted Mr Ruvinetti.
Until the isolation of Haftar is complete, the road to normalisation is still tortuous. The ceasefire, for instance, does not include the reopening of Libya’s oil fields, essential for the country’s socio-economical balance by virtue of their profit (which is stalled) and their energy supply (which is intermittent at best).
Still, as the Italian visit signals, it’s time to plant the seeds for the Italian role in Libya’s reconstruction, and perhaps obtain leverage for the stemming of migrant fluxes. Mr Di Maio is set to present Mr Di Stefano to all his interlocutors as reference point for the Italian-Libyan commercial relations.
The two hope to revive a series of contracts that have been halted by Libya’s recent history: namely, a coastal highway (which was brokered in the Benghazi Treaty signed in 2008 by Muhammar Gaddafi and Silvio Berlusconi); the ampliation of Tripoli’s international airport, inactive since 2014, where the Italian consortium Aeneas landed a 78 million deal; the expansion of Libya’s telecoms network via a collaboration between Telecom Italia Sparkle and Libyan International Telecom Company.
They will also meet with Mustafa Sanalla, head of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (Noc), deemed an instrumental asset for the country’s reconstruction.
