Covid-19, the response to authoritarianism, and its relationship with allies: is America back? Brian Katulis (Center for American Progress) sets out Biden’s foreign policy agenda
The central focus on the Biden’s administration’s first month in office was on the home front, ramping up efforts to deploy the coronavirus vaccine at home and passing measures to jumpstart America’s economy in the $1.9 million fiscal stimulus.
But even as the Biden team focused on the twin crises of the pandemic and economic pain at home, it began to set the framework for a new type of U.S. foreign policy that is neither a return to the status quo before the Trump administration or a massive reinvention that some of his more extreme left-wing critics have advocated. As the Biden team works to implement this new foreign policy approach, it should work closely with allies like Italy to achieve progress in improving transatlantic relations and strengthening the stability of the Mediterranean region.
Like a chess player making initial moves that hint at the overall strategy to be implemented later, the Biden administration has signaled certain approaches and taken some moves that offer an indication of where it will take U.S. foreign policy. But like a chess game, a lot of what happens will be determined by the moves made by other players – for every action there is a reaction.
President Joe Biden delivered two major speeches on foreign policy last month – one at the State Department and a second at the Munich Security Conference. These addresses, along with a speech delivered by his Secretary of State Tony Blinken in early March and a new national security guidance document, provide the general direction where the Biden administration seeks to take America’s revised approach on national security.
The overall template for Biden’s approach to U.S. foreign policy is evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and it is grounded in a pragmatism that looks for a new way to make sure that values and idealism are prioritized.
Looking beyond this initial effort to set the stage, three bigger picture challenges are on the immediate horizon for Biden’s foreign policy:
1) Coordinating domestic policy moves with a new foreign policy approach, especially on the pandemic and economic policy.
COVID-19 is a challenge that knows no borders, and the interlinked nature of the response requires a more coordinated effort on global vaccine deployment. Biden has already signaled a more internationalist approach to the pandemic than his predecessor had in rejoining the World Health Organization and announcing U.S. financial support to COVAX, the international effort trying to coordinate vaccine distribution to low- and middle-income countries. But Biden rejected a request from Mexico’s leader to share U.S. vaccines until Americans are vaccinated, prompting some observers to raise concerns about America engaging in a form of vaccine nationalism that could unnecessarily prolong the global pandemic.
It’s too soon to tell what Biden’s approach on the global vaccination front will be after America progress at home, but it is bound to be more internationalist than Trump’s was – in part because of mutations and continued challenges with the pandemic in parts of Europe and Brazil. A stronger international coordination effort is urgently needed.
Similarly, on the economic policy front, the Biden administration will face a challenge synchronizing America’s aggressive fiscal and monetary moves to help things at home with coordination on the global front, just as the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve, America’s central bank, did in 2009 in response to the global financial crisis. America remains the top power in the world’s global financial system and the U.S. dollar is still the unrivaled currency of choice – and the financial moves America makes at home have major ripple effects around the world.
2) Responding to authoritarian governments that essentially ignore Biden’s moves to prioritize freedom and human rights
The opening week of Biden’s presidency saw direct challenges to freedom in Russia and Myanmar – and the Biden team took to the traditional playbook of U.S. foreign policy to voice condemnation and issue sanctions. On Saudi Arabia, Biden carved out a middle path – releasing a report that held Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman directly responsible for the murder of a journalist, but taking few tangible steps to impose a cost on Saudi Arabia for its actions.
In these cases – Russia, Myanmar, and Saudi Arabia – along with a longer list of countries facing strains on their political system, the Biden administration will face tough follow-on questions when actions intended change other countries’ practices on human rights and democracy fail to fundamentally change the situation. Case in point – the crackdown in Myanmar continues despite Biden’s recent actions. A decade ago, the Obama administration’s uneven response to the Arab uprising in the Middle East made clear the gap between America’s rhetoric and actions – and other authoritarians have learned from this experience.
The broader landscape for global freedom grows bleaker – and it’s one that is unlikely to be remedied by holding a summit of democratic countries.
3) Navigating strategic gaps that exist between various U.S. partners and allies
Donald Trump as president had an approach and style that sought to gain leverage by making unexpected moves and knocking allies and adversaries off balance intentionally. Biden’s more cautious and predictable approach represents a more traditional U.S. foreign policy approach, even though its not a return to the past. A main reason why its not a return to the past – the world has fundamentally changed over the past decade, and past approaches are unlikely to yield the same results.
More and more countries are rationally hedging their geopolitical strategies – seeking to maintain positive ties with not just America but also China and in some cases Russia too. Some U.S. allies and partners in places like Europe and Asia have major differences of views among themselves about their own relations with countries like China and Russia. This overall environment of a complex multipolarity makes Biden’s template for a more multilateral approach to U.S. foreign policy a challenge to apply in practice due to the substantial differences of views among U.S. partners.
Europe remains rife with multiple internal divisions – the continent continues to see the lingering effects of Brexit. Biden has taken some steps to ease transatlantic trade tensions that rose under Trump – but the European bloc faces many challenges from within and outside.
The debate over Nord Stream 2, the Russian gas pipeline to Europe, has split Germany and France from many other important European countries for several years now. The recent move by Republican Senator Ted Cruz to slow down the nomination of Bill Burns to be CIA director in the Biden administration as a pressure tactics to seek a stronger U.S. response opposing the energy project will put this issue in the spotlight of America’s foreign policy debate even more so than it was. Add to this complicated mix the notion among some European leaders that the region should strive for greater “strategic autonomy,” a concept that is debated within Europe.
In other regions of the world, the divisions between U.S. allies and partners are quite considerable on key strategic questions. South Korea and Japan have long-standing tensions that have gotten worse in recent years, and the Middle East is rife with strains between a number of U.S. partners including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
All of this represents a major challenge of applying a multilateral playbook for U.S. foreign policy in an increasingly fractious, multipolar international system.
These challenges all point to the need for the United States to maintain and build strong bilateral partnerships just as it is seeking to implement a more multilateral agenda in a world where the international system still faces considerable strains from the pandemic and economic difficulties, as well as ongoing great power competition.
Italy remains one of America’s most important partners in Europe – and the Biden administration will be in a better position to navigate the three main challenges for its overall foreign policy in the coming months if it continues to seek close coordination with Italy on all of these fronts.
