by Linee strategiche (a narrative of global complexity)
L’impegno del governo italiano è stato costante. Dal 2013, sosteniamo con forza il Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Ttip), l’iniziativa lanciata da Stati Uniti e Unione europea (Ue), per la creazione di un accordo commerciale preferenziale. (Umberto Marengo, AffarInternazionali, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/area-transatlantico-di-libero-scambio-ttip-limperativo-dellurgenza-umberto-marengo-affarinternazionali-/)
Libia. Senza un piano per riportare la stabilità politica nel paese africano, un attacco militare per contrastare milizie affiliate all’Is è controproducente. Soprattutto per la vicina Italia. Il pericolo è di alimentare la minaccia jihadista senza risolvere la crisi in corso da quattro anni. (Giorgio Cuscito, Limes online, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/i-rischi-di-un-intervento-contro-lo-stato-islamico-nel-caos-della-libia-giorgio-cuscito-limes-online-/)
Is the so-called Islamic State more than just a secessionist movement? Tanisha Fazal believes so. While the group controls territory and challenges the authority of existing states, it also represents a formidable challenge to the Westphalian international system. (Tanisha M. Fazal, ISN Security Watch, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/is-the-islamic-state-a-secessionist-movement-tanisha-m-fazal-isn-security-watch-/)
The economics of neighborhood and regional integration are quite important in regions that are particularly land-locked. However, a regional economic integration process has thus far almost bypassed the Central Asia-South Asia economic interaction. Now is when both the regions need to integrate to address their developmental challenges. This assumes special importance in the context of what has come to be known since the Istanbul process as the Heart of Asia initiative. The term ‘Heart of Asia’ refers to Afghanistan and its extended neighbors. It does not denote a new geographical entity; instead Afghanistan’s crucial role is recognized as the land-bridge connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia/Europe and the Middle East. (Ram Upendra Das, Eurasia Review, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/rationale-for-and-constraints-to-south-asia-central-asia-economic-linkages-ram-upendra-das-eurasia-review-/)
Earlier this week, Malaysian defense minister Hishammuddin Hussein reiterated his country’s desire to establish an ASEAN peacekeeping force as the chair of the grouping this year. (Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/malaysia-wants-an-asean-peacekeeping-force-prashanth-parameswaran-the-diplomat-/)
The number of Cambodian families newly affected by land conflicts has tripled in a year, a local NGO said earlier this week. (Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/cambodian-land-conflicts-surge-prashanth-parameswaran-the-diplomat-/)
Australia has been edging closer to embracing the Indian Ocean region for several years and finally openly declared in the 2013 Defence White Paper that it considered the Indian Ocean to be a key interest of the country. The international compulsions behind Australia’s new focus, from the rise of India to the concern over China’s recent posturing to the securing of its neighbouring sea lanes from criminal activities, are all relatively well known. Less widely discussed are Australia’s domestic factors that have led to this relatively new policy approach. This dearth of analysis naturally beggars the question: what, if any, are the domestic motivations behind Australia’s relatively new interest in the Indian Ocean? ( Stephen Westcott, IPCS, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/australian-interests-in-the-indian-ocean-domestic-motivations-stephen-westcott-ipcs-/)
New Zealand’s defense chief, Lieutenant General Tim Keating, is currently in Saudi Arabia for talks on fighting ISIS. (Helen Clark, The Diplomat, http://www.lineestrategiche.org/news/new-zealand-considers-role-on-isis-helen-clark-the-diplomat-/)
