From Sputnik to Ukraine, will Russia drift away from Europe?

Russia is moving away from Europe, wrote Maurizio Molinari [the Italian newspaper’s editor in chief, eds] on Repubblica. The operations of Russian agents on European territory are certainly nothing new, but they are part of a worrying context: the progressive deterioration of relations between Moscow and Europe.

In the midst of the pandemic, German counterintelligence has disrupted various Russian attempts to infiltrate the Bundestag, which has been the target of cyberattacks. And attempts are multiplying to steal confidential NATO information in the countries which Russia considers more “penetrable.”

By emphasizing a modestly-sized intelligence operation Italy wanted to send a signal on the matter, both to Moscow and consequently to Washington. This is not a phase that allows for ambiguity, with the Trump presidency over and the current level of tension between Washington and the Kremlin.

Italy’s moves are simple enough to read, yet it is harder to foresee what impact will Russia’s strategy have on European cohesion. As indicated by the unsuccessful outcome of last February’s Moscow visit by Josep Borrell, High Representative of European foreign policy, [Vladimir] Putin‘s Russia now considers the EU an “unreliable partner” (according to the definition publicly given by Serghej Lavrov, the master of Russian foreign policy).

Moscow plays the card of bilateral relations – as it has done for years – aiming to accentuate the differences in position between European countries. The novelty is that the Kremlin is using vaccination diplomacy (i.e. the Sputnik V vaccine, from Hungary to Lombardy) for this purpose, in addition to the traditional energy-related levers.

Above all, Moscow now combines these “positive” incentives with increasingly “negative” actions, including digital infiltrations, the spread of fake news and military espionage. All this is set against a backdrop where Vladimir Putin’s regime, after having theorized “sovereign democracy” as its North Star, claims it has no explanation to give to Europe in terms of respect for human rights (Navalny case) and international interventions (from Ukraine to Libya).

The recent dispatch of 4,000 Russian soldiers to the Ukrainian borders confirms that Moscow is unwilling to compromise in the management of what it considers its natural area of ​​influence over the former Soviet space. By keeping instability at the European borders high, Russia aims, among other things, to increase its contractual weight in the Euro-Mediterranean theater. And is worryingly testing the Biden administration.

On the other hand, the transition from Trump to Biden complicates Moscow’s calculations on the possibility of dividing Europe and the United States. Despite highly controversial nodes such as Nord Stream 2, the distance between the two sides of the Atlantic has shrunk, at least during this initial phase. And the sanctions, which are now coordinated, are destined to continue.

Putin has long since abandoned the idea that Europe can guarantee Russia’s technological modernization. For this reason, too, Moscow now seems willing to enter a convenience marriage with Beijing, thus taking the risk of finding itself in the condition of being China’s junior partner.

Is Moscow doing the math well? According to what emerged from a conference organized by Aspen Institute Italia and Chatham House, the answer is probably negative. Russia’s policy effectively renders the recurring ambitions to “reset” relations with Moscow impractical: Joe Biden has dropped the initial illusions of the Obama era, even though he negotiates control of nuclear weapons with the Kremlin (extension of the New Start Treaty and negotiations with Iran) and discusses about Afghanistan.

Emmanuel Macron, who until a few months ago spoke of relaunching bilateral dialogue with Moscow, is using much harsher tones; Britain’s new post-Brexit foreign policy strategy identifies Russia as the main threat to national security. It’s unclear how post-Merkel Germany, the central country, will move; but the political rise of the German Greens (who oppose Nord Stream 2) worries Moscow.

Therefore, the climate is set to worsen in relations between Russia, Europe and the United States. In theory, Western countries would have every interest in salvaging Russia in a strategic phase dominated by competition with China. In fact, this is a goal that cannot be pursued without a signal of change from Moscow.

The most realistic prediction, however, is that Russia’s approach will not change in the short term because it appears to be connected to the essential spring of latter-phase Putinism: the preservation of power by the “strong but weak” man (Foreign Affairs definition) in the Kremlin. Only in a more long-term scenario will Russia be able to assess the costs of this progressive detachment from the West.

In the twenty years of his rule, Putin first strengthened himself with economic successes, driven by the price of oil; then, in his second decade in the Kremlin, he was boosted by a nationalist wave which was in turn galvanized by the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The first factor has lost weight and will further lose it with the energy transition; the second always exerts an influence, but with decreasing political returns.

In the third phase that has opened, the Kremlin leader no longer has many levers at his disposal. He is likely to emphasize the internal authoritarian squeeze, along with external assertiveness, in order to rule Russia and thus guarantee the interests – which are actually partially contradictory – of the groups that support him (security apparatuses, economic oligarchy, bureaucracy).

But this is a recipe that will further complicate Russia’s difficulties, frustrating its great power ambitions and increasing social dissatisfaction, which is largely connected to economic problems (concentrated growth and poor redistribution). The harshness with which Moscow has handled the Navalny case (with its condemnation of corruption) must also be read within this context. Meanwhile, history teaches us that a declining power can be just as dangerous as a rising power.

It is quite evident that Western countries have made assessment errors in managing relations with Moscow after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Part of Russia’s current frustration, and its detachment from the West, derives from the perception that the United States nurtured after its victory of the Cold War, a punitive peace in Moscow. On its part, Europe never managed to set up a truly unitary strategy for Russia, especially after its enlargement to the East.

However, past mistakes cannot push the United States and Europe to justify Putin’s current choices, whether it be the Navalny case or the intervention in Ukraine. The West may have lost Russia at the end of the last century; but today it is Russia that is losing the West.

This article has been translated by Otto Lanzavecchia from the original Italian and lightly edited for the sake of clarity and readability